Insights

Perspectives on economics and finances with GFD

A Century of Chinese Stocks and Bonds

Global Financial Data has the most extensive database on historical stocks available anywhere in the world.  GFD has collected data on stocks that listed on the London Stock Exchange from the 1600s until 2018.  London was the financial center of the world until World War II, and many companies in emerging markets listed their shares on the London Stock Exchange before a stock exchange even existed in that country. After World War I, many companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange.  Using data from London and New York, we can calculate stock market indices for emerging markets during the 1800s and 1900s before stocks listed on local exchanges and local emerging market indices were calculated. This is one in a series of articles about those countries.  

Chinese Stocks Before World War II

Shares traded in Shanghai before any trading of Chinese shares occurred in London.  The Shanghai Stock Exchange began trading in 1866 and included several banks and other companies. By the 1930s, Shanghai was the financial center of China with trading occurring in stocks, debentures, government bonds and futures.  In 1937, Japan occupied Shanghai, and on December 8, 1941, share trading in Shanghai was halted by the Japanese.  Share trading resumed in 1946, but was discontinued when the Communists seized power in 1949.  The stock market remained closed until November 1990 when the Shanghai Stock Exchange reopened.  Today, the Shanghai Stock Exchange is one of the largest in the world with $4 trillion listed on the Shanghai stock exchange.
 

   
Wenzhong Fan has put together an annual index of stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange using data from The North China Herald that stretches from 1871 until 1940. The market index he created using this data is illustrated in Figure 1 above.  It would appear that stocks did very well after World War I, with the index rising in price to almost 20,000 providing an annual return between 1871 and 1940 of 7.9%, but this was primarily because of the inflation that ravaged China during the 1930s.  If the values are converted into USD as is illustrated in Figure 2 below, the returns are still positive, but the increases are much more moderate. The index provided an annual return of 2.35% between 1871 and 1940, not 7.9%. Although Fan’s index is based upon a larger sample of stocks than was available on the London Stock Exchange, the data are annual rather than monthly so GFD’s China indices can provide detail that Fan’s indices cannot. It is interesting looking at the sectors that are covered by the stocks that were listed in Shanghai to see both which sectors are included and which are excluded.  The major omission is railroads, which the Europeans wanted to build to exploit Chinese resources and the isolationist Chinese mandarins opposed. Between 1881 and 1895 only 18 miles of railways were built per year in China, but when the Chinese government realized how railroads could help the government put down the Boxer Rebellion between 1899 and 1901, a railway boom ensued, though one managed by the government for military purposes. By 1911, 6,000 miles of railway had been laid. However, transport stocks were not completely ignored in China. There are a large number of shipping, canal and dock companies that traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  One unexpectedly large sector in Shanghai was Plantations since there were numerous rubber estates located around Shanghai. There were also a large number of finance companies, including banks, insurance and real estate companies as well as utilities, but no other sectors stand out as representing a large number of companies in China.  
 

   
The Shanghai Stock Exchange was modest in size.  Starting off at $23 million in market capitalization in 1871, the market increased in size to $1.7 billion at its peak in 1925, but declined in size to $235 million upon its closure in 1941. This amount was just a fraction of China’s GDP because key sectors, such as railroads, were not publicly traded, and the companies that were publicly traded only existed in the main cities such as Shanghai and Hong Kong where foreigners were allowed to live and trade.  

Shanghai Stocks Listed in London

The data from London only cover the period from 1896 until 1930.  During that period of time, GFD’s index of Chinese shares, illustrated in Figure 3 below, rose from 100 to 158 on a price basis providing an annual increase of 1.36% and from 100 to 634 on a return basis providing an annual return of 5.58% and a dividend yield of 4.16%.  This compares favorably with Fan’s return of 4.54% during the same period of time. There was never a grass roots effort to develop the economy through capital markets or to integrate the Chinese economy with the rest of the world. The companies that were listed in London represented a handful of companies that tried to develop Chinese resources, not Chinese entrepreneurs trying to raise capital for domestic production.  It should be noted that by comparison, the market cap of Shanghai shares listed in London was only $35 million in 1925, but Hong Kong shares listed in London, mainly the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HKSB), was $110 million.  Because of China’s isolation, British capital never played an important role in China outside of Hong Kong.
 

   
Only six stocks that were listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange traded in London.  These were the British and Chinese Corp. (1909-1930), China Mutual Steam Navigation (1896-1900), Chinese Engineering and Mining (1907-1930), the Pekin Syndicate (1900-1930), Shanghai Waterworks (1923-1927) and Shanghai Electric Construction Co. (1924-1926). As is true of most emerging markets during this period of time, little return was provided by changes in the price of the underlying stocks.  Most of the return came from dividends that investors would have had to reinvest in the stock market.  The return index for Chinese Stocks is illustrated in Figure 4 below.  

 

 

The Performance of Chinese Government Bonds

Probably the best long-run chart of Chinese finance is the price of Chinese government bonds that were listed in London.  As Figure 5 shows, Chinese bonds traded above par until the beginning of World War I in 1914, but after that, Chinese bonds began a fairly steady decline as the political situation in China worsened and China defaulted on its bonds.  Surprisingly, the declaration of the Chinese republic in 1912 had little impact on the value of Chinese bonds, but after the declaration of World War I, interest rates rose, and Chinese bonds declined in value with new lows in 1916, 1920 and 1927.
China defaulted on most of its sterling loans in 1924 and 1925.  The market recovered in the 1930s, rising above par and peaking in 1936, when an effort was made by China to rehabilitate these loans in 1936 and 1937.  However, the invasion of China by Japan in 1937 when the Japanese captured both Shanghai and Nanjing drove the price of Chinese bonds down since investors knew that little money would be available for paying coupons.  Chinese bonds rallied back between 1939 and 1945 as investors regained faith that the Allies would help China remove the Japanese from the country and enable China to deal with the default on their government bonds, but the civil war in China after World War II put paid to any chance investors were going to receive payment on the coupons, much less have the bonds redeemed.  

Hong Kong Stocks Listed in London

The Hong Kong Stock Exchange was set up in 1891 when the Association of Stock Brokers in Hong Kong was established. It was renamed the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1914. The Hong Kong Stockbrokers Association was founded in 1921 and merged with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1947.  Three new exchanges were founded between 1969 and 1972 and they all merged into a single exchange in 1986. The Hang Seng Index was introduced on July 31, 1964 and is still the benchmark for Hong Kong 54 years later, but what happened to Hong Kong Stocks before 1964? The GFD Hong Kong index included only two stocks in 1964, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the Indo-China Steam Navigation Co., but HKSB listed on the London Stock Exchange from 1868 until the present providing an incomparable set of data to analyze.   The bank stock’s performance between 1868 and 1969 is shown below in Figure 6 which illustrates over a century of stock prices in Hong Kong.  The expected peaks and declines can be easily picked out.
 

   
The decline in the early 1890s was driven by the banking crisis in Hong Kong which occurred in 1890; however, the 1895 Treaty of Shimoneseki opened up the Chinese market to foreign investors and the stock market boomed for the next 10 years.  There was a rubber boom between 1909 and 1910 driving prices up, but the Revolution of 1911 which overthrew the Ch’ing Dynasty had little overall impact on the stock market. There was cotton speculation in 1919 and a second rubber boom in 1925, both of which are illustrated by peaks in the stock market index. However, in 1931, Japan invaded northern China, seized Shanghai in 1937, and the Shanghai Stock Exchange closed on December 5, 1941. The index performed relatively well during the 1940s, but collapsed in 1949 after the Communists took over China.  Once the threat of the Communists taking over Hong Kong receded, the index rose steadily until the 1960s when Hong Kong became the entrepôt for southern China. The London Stock Exchange listed shares in Hong Kong companies such as the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (1868-), China Submarine Telegraph Ltd. (1870-1873), Hong Kong and China Gas Co. (1865-1920) and Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. (1940-1952, 1956-1969).  Data on these four shares was used to put together the index provided in Figure 6. The index of Hong Kong Stocks rose from 100 in December 1868 to 680 in December 1968, providing an annual price increase over those 100 years of 1.94%.  The return index rose from 1 to 1300 during the same period of time, providing an annual return of 7.43% and an annual dividend yield of 5.38% over those 100 years.  Granted, the index primarily keeps track of one stock, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., but the bank did provide a consistent level of return to its shareholders.  If you compare the performance of Hong Kong stocks between 1896 and 1930 with those in Shanghai, the Hong Kong Shares returned 2.68% per annum and 8.72% after including dividends, clearly superior to the 5.58% total return that Shanghai stocks provided.  

What if?

It is unfortunate that the number of Chinese stocks that listed in London is so limited, but it does provide us with insight into the performance of shares that would otherwise be unavailable.  One alternative would be to use the Far Eastern Economic Review to create a broad index of stocks between the end of World War II and the creation of the Hang Seng Index in 1964. Of course, the ultimate speculation, which can never be answered, is what might have happened if the Communists had never seized power in 1949.  The Taiwan Stock Exchange began operating on February 9, 1962 and helped Taiwan to establish its technological prowess in semiconductors and other areas of technology.  What if the Shanghai Stock Exchange had never closed in 1949? How different would China be today if the Kuomintang had defeated the Communists? Unfortunately, we shall never know.

The Coming Decline in the CAPE Ratios

Global Financial Data has the most extensive collection of CAPE Ratios available anywhere.  Our CAPE Ratios cover over 50 countries and the CAPE Ratio for the United States begins in 1841, 40 years before the CAPE Ratios that were calculated by Shiller using data from the Cowles Commission. The Cyclically-Adjusted Price-Earnings (CAPE) Ratio is an inflation-adjusted average of earnings paid over the past 10 years relative to the current price of the market. A recession can have a dramatic impact on the CAPE Ratio, pushing it up as earnings decline, reducing the average amount of earnings paid over the past ten years.  A recession can have a particularly large impact if net earnings turn into losses which are netted out against profits in the future.  Although losses for the stock market as a whole are rare, they do occur. The last time the S&P 500 reported a net loss was in the fourth quarter of 2008, which was the first quarterly loss the S&P 500 had registered since 1936! Since 1871, the S&P 500 has never registered net losses for a full year, only for quarters in 1936 and 2008. We can see the impact of this loss on the CAPE Ratio by comparing the 7-year CAPE Ratio with the 10-year CAPE Ratio.  The 7-year CAPE Ratio has already removed the 2008 losses from its calculations while the 10-year CAPE Ratio will begin excluding the losses in 2019. As the graph below illustrates, the 7-year CAPE Ratio dipped below the 10-year in 2016 just as the 2008 losses were removed from the calculations.  Since then, the 7-year CAPE Ratio has remained below the 10-year CAPE Ratio and is currently about 4 points below. We would anticipate that the 10-year CAPE Ratio will see a similar drop even if there were no change in the price of the S&P 500, and with the S&P 500 flirting with a bear market, this will drive the CAPE Ratio down even further. It appears that the 10-year CAPE Ratio for the S&P 500 peaked in January 2018, ten years after the quarterly loss, and is now on a steady downward path for the next few years if only because the losses and low profits of 2008 will no longer be included in the calculation of the 10-year CAPE Ratio.  How much the current bear market drives down the CAPE Ratio remains to be seen.  
 

 

Singapore: The Crazy, Rich Rubber City-State

Global Financial Data has the most extensive database on historical stocks available anywhere.  In particular, we have collected data on stocks that listed on the London Stock Exchange from the 1600s until 2018.  London was the financial center of the world until World War I and many countries in emerging markets listed shares on the London Stock Exchange before a stock exchange even existed in that country.  This enables us to calculate stock market indices for emerging markets during the 1800s and 1900s before stocks listed on local exchanges and local emerging market indices were introduced. This is one in a series of articles about those indices. Singapore is one of the most important financial centers in Asia, and has grown from a small island of 1.6 million in 1960 to over 5 million people with a per capita income of over $55,000. Any information about the historical performance of stocks in Singapore is a welcome addition to the financial history of the city-state.  

Singapore Before Singapore.

Stamford Raffles founded Singapore as a trading post of the British East India Company in 1819.  The city became part of the Straits Settlements in 1826 and its capital in 1836. The British were defeated in the Battle of Singapore on February 15, 1942 when 60,000 British troops surrendered to the Japanese in one of the worst defeats of British forces in history. The Japanese surrendered on August 15, 1945, but the failure of the British to protect Singapore from the Japanese lowered Britain’s standing in the eyes of Singaporeans. Malaysia and Singapore were granted self-government in 1959, but because of economic and political differences, Singapore seceded from Malaysia and became an independent republic on August 9, 1965. The Malayan Stock Exchange was set up on May 9, 1960.  Floors for trading shares were set up in both Kuala Lumpur and in Singapore.  After Singapore seceded, the structure of the stock exchange remained the same, but its name was changed to the Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore.  When currency interchangeability was terminated between Malaysia and Singapore in 1973, the Stock Exchange of Singapore separated from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. As this brief history shows, there was no trading of Singapore stocks in Singapore before 1960.  Singapore stocks were traded in London or not at all. GFD has been able to collect data on a handful of Singapore stocks in order to put together an index of Singapore shares before local trading began.  

Singapore Shares Before Independence

Singapore, as well as most of Malaysia, was a center for rubber production before World War II. The largest of these companies was the Straits Rubber Co., Ltd. which was registered in 1909, reorganized in 1919, and was acquired by Consolidated Plantations in 1972. Two other Singapore rubber companies registered in London were the Bukit Sembawang Estates and the Singapore United Rubber Plantations.  These three companies made up the Singapore shares that traded in London before 1960. In essence, GFD’s Singapore stock index is an index of rubber companies. The market capitalization of these three companies remained small peaking at $2 million in 1920, and remaining below $1 million between 1921 and 1957. There is a gap in the index between 1957 and 1961 and after 1961, the Singapore Traction Co., Bajau Rubber and Produce Estate were added to shares of the Straits Rubber Co. to represent Singapore stocks in London.  The price index of Singapore stocks from 1915 until 1957 is provided below in Figure 1.
 

   
The index had large increases when World War I began as the demand for rubber increased.  When the war was over, the demand for rubber collapsed and the price of rubber stocks declined as well.  A graph of the price of rubber between 1910 and 1960 is provided below in Figure 2.  Both rubber price spikes in 1925 and in 1950 are reflected in the index with shares rising in price, and declining thereafter.  Who in today’s modern Singapore of crazy, rich Asians would have realized the intimate relationship between the price of rubber and the performance of the stock market before the city gained its independence?  

 

 
From a price point of view, investors lost money during the 50 years the GFD index covers.  The only return was from dividends which could be reinvested in the company.  The log graph below shows the impact of reinvesting dividends on the total return.  Clearly, with reinvested dividends the return is positive.
One dollar invested in Singapore stocks in 1915 would have returned $0.48 by 1957, an annual loss of 1.73%.  Return data goes back to 1920 and $1 invested in Singapore stocks in 1920 would have return $2.97 in 1957, and annual return of 2.90%. Stocks would have provided an annual dividend yield of 5.05% during that same period of time. The data begin again in 1961 and continues until 1977.  Actual data from the Singapore Stock Exchange begins in 1965.  We can chain link GFD’s data to the Financial Times Straits Times Index and extend that index back to 1961 providing even more long-term data than was previously available.  

Conclusion

Singapore illustrates the benefit of using data from the London Stock Exchange to learn about the past of Asian markets.  Though Singapore is no longer an emerging market, it has become a major financial center of the world with per capita income of over $55,000 per person.  However, before gaining its independence, Singapore was a major port that shipped rubber to the rest of the world and the Straits Rubber Co. was the largest corporation in the country.  The performance of the stock market followed changes in the price of rubber for decades, but once Singapore gained its independence, rubber lost its importance, and it is today one of the financial capitals of the world.

The Hatry Group Collapse Much Ado About Nothing

Though few people have heard about the collapse of the Hatry Group of companies in September 1929, some people have claimed that it triggered the New York stock market crash of October 1929 and ultimately the Great Depression.  Our review of the facts has led us to believe that the collapse of the Hatry Group had little impact on financial markets, despite the claims to the contrary. Hatry no more caused the crash of 1929 than Bernie Madoff caused the Great Recession of 2008.  

Clarence Hatry: Flamboyant Entrepreneur

Clarence Hatry was a dedicated self-promoter who never had a chance of being part of the British upper crust.  Hatry was the son of a prosperous Jewish silk merchant and was bankrupt by the age of 25. He built his fortune by speculating in oil stocks and promoting industrial conglomerates. Like any entrepreneur, he had spectacular successes and spectacular failures.  He built a retail conglomerate, the Drapery Trust, which he sold to the department store Debenhams. He engineered the merger of the London bus corporations into the London General Omnibus Company, ran a stockbroking firm that specialized in municipal bonds, set up the Photomaton Parent Company, which operated a chain of photographic booths, and controlled the Associated Automatic Machine Corporation which owned vending machines on railway platforms.  He certainly knew how to diversify his holdings.  

Hatry made large profits and spent money freely trying to buy his way into the British elite. Before he went bankrupt in 1925, he owned the biggest yacht in the British Isles. He lived in a house formerly owned by David Ricardo at 56 Upper Brook Street, then moved to an ornate mansion at 5 Stanhope Gate in Mayfair which had a swimming pool on the roof where he held parties. He installed a Tudor-style cocktail bar in the mansion’s sub-basement which he labeled “Ye Old Stanhope Arms-Free House.” Hatry got the 16th Marquess of Winchester to be the chairman of Corporation and General Securities, Ltd. Of course, he also owned a house in the country, racing horses and all the other signs of being part of the British upper class. But the British elites which would never have accepted him, no matter how much money he spent.  Hatry belonged in Hollywood, not Mayfair.  

The Collapse of the Hatry Group

Hatry’s hubris led him to think that he could rationalize the British steel industry by merging a number of steel and iron companies into the United Steel Companies which he bought for $40 million in what was to be a leveraged buyout, but at the last moment, the bankers withdrew their financing.  Hatry began scrambling for cash, and even went to Montagu Norman, the head of the Bank of England to get a bridge loan for the acquisition.  Now, you have to understand, this was equivalent to P.T. Barnum going to J.P. Morgan to borrow money for his museum.  Norman simply told Hatry he had paid too much for United Steel. Hatry began borrowing money against his companies and eventually committed petty fraud, by forging City of Wakefield 4.5% bonds which he used as collateral to raise money.  Corporation and General Securities Ltd. had issued the bonds, raising £750,000 of which only £450,000 was turned over to the city of Wakefield. Rumors about Hatry’s overextension began to circulate and the value of his companies began to plunge.  By September 17, Hatry had assets of £4 million and liabilities of £19 million. Hatry knew the end was nigh. If Hatry didn’t know how to enter British society in proper fashion, he certainly exited in proper British form.  Hatry called his accountant and admitted to his forgery.  His accountant called Sir Archibald Bodkin, the director of public prosecutions and advised him of the “stupendous” scandal and that Hatry would turn himself into the office the next morning.  The next day, Hatry had lunch at the Charing Cross Hotel, and went to Sir Bodkin’s office in the Guildhall, where he and three other directors were refused bail. They were remanded to custody.
 

   
On September 20, trading was suspended in the Drapery Trust and the Hatry Group of companies.  This included Corporation and General Securities Ltd., which was an investment trust that had issued the forged City of Wakefield bonds, the Photomaton Parent Corp., the Automatic Machine Corp., Retail Trade Securities, Ltd. and the Oak Investment Corp.  According to one headline from a 1929 newspaper, these companies had already plunged in price by £8 million ($40 million).  Corporation and General Securities was trading at 4/6 (about $1) so even with trading suspended, most of the losses had already been incurred.  At the trial, it was announced that the six principal companies had liabilities of $143 million, of which $67.5 million was irretrievably lost. Shareholders in the Hatry Group were allegedly forced to liquidate their stocks in New York to cover their losses in London which helped to precipitate the crash of 1929. When we reviewed the six companies that were suspended, we found that none of the companies was listed in the Investors Monthly Manual, which listed the 1000 largest securities traded in London.  Moreover, the $40 million loss in the value of these six companies represented about 0.1% of the value of shares that were traded in London.  In Lords of Finance, Liaquat Ahamed claimed that the Bank of England raised interest rates to 7.5% because Sterling was imperiled by the Hatry collapse, but how such a small group of companies could have caused a panic in London and New York seems hard to fathom. The collapse of the Hatry Group no more caused the Crash of 1929 than Bernie Madoff caused the collapse of the American financial system in 2008. The New York stock market declined the week of September 20, but another month passed before the market collapsed.  If the Hatry Group had collapsed a few months earlier or later than September 1929, few would have noticed.  

Hatry’s Revenge

Hatry was sentenced to 14 years in prison for his fraud, of which he served 9 years. While Hatry was in prison, he worked in the prison library.  After Hatry was released, he bought into Hatchard’s bookstore in Piccadilly, which is the oldest bookstore in London.  The bookstore was doing poorly and Hatry discovered the reason for the store’s poor performance was that many of its customers were using the bookstore as a library and weren’t paying for their books.  Hatry told the customers that he planned on removing the books from the book store window and putting a list of what the members of the British elites owed in the bookstore window. This unique method of debt collection worked, the customers settled their bills, and the bookstore was successful.  Hatry got payback against the elites who had rejected him.
 

REQUEST A DEMO with a GFDFinaeon Specialist

Please type your first name.
Please type your last name.
Please type your phone number in the following format 123-456-7890
Invalid email address.
Please type your company name.
Invalid Input
Image

Information

Our comprehensive financial databases span global markets offering data never compiled into an electronic format. We create and generate our own proprietary data series while we continue to investigate new sources and extend existing series whenever possible. GFD supports full data transparency to enable our users to verify financial data points, tracing them back to the original source documents. GFD is the original supplier of complete historical data.

address_icon 29122 Rancho Viejo Road, Suite 214, San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675
phone_icon_bl 949.542.4200